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Community currencies are known for decades and observed in developing and developed 
countries. They are, usually, created to fight financial and social exclusion and promote local 
development. Although there are several community currency projects around the world, very 
little studies have covered the particular case of those that circulating in digital format. Regarded 
as a way to improve management of community currency systems, new implementations based 
on plastic cards cell phones, or blockchain technologies, are becoming more common, as 
technology is becoming more accessible and financial crisis creates opportunities for the 
emergence of alternatives to the traditional financial system. If technology is expected to 
collaborate in transparency, costs and speed of transactions, it also imposes challenges to 
communities that implement them. In this scenario, the objective of this article is to explore 
conflict and benefits of the community currency that circulates in a digital format, investigating 
this phenomenon as a particular case of digital payment platform. Analyzing 22 digital 
community currencies, we propose a taxonomy that divided them in four groups, and then 
explore emergent conflicts and benefits for each of them.  
Keywords: community currencies; digital payment; digital currencies; payment platforms; 
taxonomy  
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INTRODUCTION 
Virtual currencies can be defined as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and 
usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific 
virtual community” (European Central Bank, 2012:13) or as “a medium of exchange that 
operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all the attributes of real 
currency”  (US Department of Treasury, 2013:1). It is implicit in those definitions the concern of 
regulation institutions with the emergence of digital currency platforms and the communities 
surrounding these platforms. Taking the incredibly complex arena of digital currencies, this 
paper will concentrate only on digital community currencies universe, despite their potential 
connections with the mainstream payment industry. 
Community currencies are generally regarded as tools for fighting social exclusion and 
encouraging local development by promoting financial inclusion (Blanc, 2011). The same way as 
all currencies are increasingly becoming digital, community currencies are also entering in the 
digital payment platforms universe as the so-called digital community currency (DCC). Based on 
the use of cell phones, plastic cards, blockchain, or the Internet, DCC is being considered one of 
the main trends in the field of community currencies (Freire, 2011; Warner, 2014) and also 
regarded as a way to promote cost reduction and better management of community currency 
systems (Diniz, Nascimento, & Cernev, 2016).  
Although there is some knowledge already built around community currencies and its role to 
promote social and financial inclusion, studies on DCC, however, are rather rare. In one hand, 
previous studies extensively covering worldwide cases of community currency – in developing 
and developed countries – have not been paying much attention on the particular issues related to 
its digital format (Freire, 2011; Schroeder, Miyazaki, & Fare, 2011; Fare & Ahmed, 2014). On 
the other hand, studies on digital payments usually ignore the particular case of community 
currencies. Comprehensive studies on mobile payments for financial inclusion (de Albuquerque, 
Diniz et al., 2016; Dahlberg, Guo, & Ondrus, 2015; Duncombe & Boateng, 2009), for example, 
do not mention any case of DCC.  
In this sense, this article aims to shed light on the subject of DCC by understanding it as part of 
the digital payment platform scenario and, given the general trend towards digital payments, the 
research question guiding this study presented on DCC is: what are the conflicts and benefits 
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faced by community currencies when implemented in digital platforms? To answer this question, 
we propose a taxonomy for classifying DCCs based on combination of elements taken from the 
literature about community currencies and digital platforms. We then discuss conflicts and 
benefits of each group of DCC identified in the taxonomy. 
This taxonomy was created to classify 22 selected cases of DCC, captured from an extensive 
search in sources related to the community currencies. Based on this analysis, four different 
categories of community currencies circulating in digital format were noted. The presented 
taxonomy is useful to researchers interested on the community currency topic, as well as the ones 
investigating digital payments platforms. Discussing each of the emerging categories from the 
proposed taxonomy helped us to provide insights about the conflicts and benefits for 
implementing DCCs, offering a new theoretical frame for investigating particular cases of digital 
payment platforms.  
Although digital payment platforms, in particular mobile payment, has been described as a topic 
of relevance for financial inclusion in developing countries (Duncombe & Boateng, 2009), the 
importance of DCC is not only restricted to developing countries, since there are many projects 
also in developed countries, as we show in the selected cases for this study. 
The main dimensions adopted in this paper to analyze DCCs were built according to community 
currency and digital payment platforms literature and are presented in the next two sections. The 
following sections describes the taxonomy building method used to classify the DCCs. Then the 
22 selected currencies are presented and analyzed according to their classification in the 
proposed taxonomy. The paper closes with a discussion of the conflicts and benefits for 
implementing each group of DCC identified and comments on the digital payments platform as a 
way to understand community currencies. 
COMMUNITY CURRENCIES  
While money has intrinsic relationship with a territory (Santos, 2009), community currency 
redefine the hierarchy between the local and the national in order to stand as a means of 
payment, which may also be an instrument for fighting the problems caused either by money in 
the capitalist system or by the system itself (Burigo, 2001). In addition to being “a trading 
instrument and means of payment created and operated by self-managed associations” (Singer, 
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2009, p.3), community currencies generally circulate in a restricted geographic region or 
community (Freire, 2011). 
Important to notice that, by studying the theme of community currencies, we find references 
mentioning "complementary currencies", "social currencies" or "local currencies" (Renert, 2013; 
Blanc, 2011) as well as references to Local Complementary Currency Systems and Local 
Exchange Employment and Trading Systems as common names used for identifying the same 
phenomenon (Gómez, 2010; Seyfang & Longhurst, 2013). In this paper we will adopt the broad 
term community currency for all kinds of alternative currencies with an explicit social goal 
(Place & Bindewald, 2013). 
There are several community currency goals in the literature. For example, Ranalli (2013) 
discuss the usefulness of community currencies in the refugee camps, suffering from shortage of 
currency and local resources. Bácsi and Herczeg (2014) explore the potential of local currencies 
as a useful tool for liquidity risk management for  small and medium-sized enterprises. Coetzee 
(2010) discusses the use of community currencies in virtual communities. Gomez (2009) studied 
the case of “Club de Trueque” in Argentine, that achieved more de 2 million people during a 
financial crisis, and Freire (2011) discusses the potential of community currencies as a tool for 
improving financial inclusion and for strengthening solidary relationships.  
The use of community currency has been rising over the past two decades and it is possible to 
count a large number of active community currencies (Seyfang & Longhurst, 2013). Crisis in the 
mainstream global economy and new possibilities enabled by information technology can be the 
main reason to explain the growth of community currency projects worldwide (Carroll and 
Bellotti, 2015). Despite their differences, these currencies represent an alternative financial 
system and, together with community banks, mutual credit, crowdfunding, and credit unions, 
they are said to promote a financial revolution led by civil society (Sanchis-Palacio, 2015). 
Typologies of Community Currencies 
It is hard to say the exact number of systems in operation in the world due to the lack of reliable 
data on the matter (Seyfang & Longhurst, 2013), nevertheless there are several tentative 
classifications for this phenomenon. Blanc (2011), for instance, proposes a typology dividing the 
currencies according to their nature covering territorial, community and economic dimensions. 
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Another classification (Martignoni, 2012) organizes community currencies into eleven different 
groups, according to their purpose, trust mechanism, issuance, and circulation. Seyfang & 
Longhurst (2013) used a community currency database with 3,428 currencies from 23 countries 
in 6 continents to propose 4 categories based on the projects’ goals and Tichit et al. (2015),  
based on lexical analysis of 320 community-currency websites, proposed 5 categories 
considering how those projects defined themselves in relation to the standard monetary system. 
Although it is very difficult to compare all these classifications, they seem not to properly 
explore the technological dimension of the community currency projects. This gap is very 
important, especially when considering the disruptive potential of digital payments combined 
with alternative payment methods that community currencies represent. 
Digital Community Currencies 
Even though the use of community currencies is spreading, problems related to community 
currencies management and implementation can undermine their acceptance (Warner, 2014). 
Some problems, such as difficulty in making community currencies to be used as change, to 
access exchange channels, and to be accepted by local businesses, are commonly mentioned 
(Freire, 2011). Other problems, such as operational management of paper money, its durability, 
and storage security, are related to the paper-printing format (Diniz et al., 2016; Lietaer & 
Hallsmith, 2006). Blanc and Fare (2013) also mention problems with fraud and counterfeiting. 
Although those mentioned problems could damage the reliability of community currencies, as 
pointed out in a Bank of England document about banknotes, positioned as local initiatives “the 
limited scale of current schemes is also a mitigating factor” (Naqvi  & Southgate, 2013). On the 
other hand, issuing community currencies in a digital format could represent a solution to some 
of the aforementioned problems, besides allowing cost savings and better management of the 
money circulating within a community (Diniz et al., 2016; Cassoni & Ramada, 2013; Schroeder, 
2013). However, the creation and maintenance of DCC do not take place without some 
difficulties.  
One difficulty discussed by Diniz, Cernev, and de Albuquerque (2013) is related to interaction 
among actors that bring the new technology infrastructure and the community that issues the 
currency. The authors analyzed a Brazilian DCC implementation via mobile phone that did not 
prosper and pointed out the project governance as the main cause of its failure.  
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Another difficulty is related to how technology affects social aspects of financial transactions in 
a community. Ferreira et al. (2015) explored the technology dimension of the British local 
currency Bristol Pound and found out that face-to-face transactions help to reinforce the trust on 
payment. These authors noted that the SMS (acronym for Short Message Systems, used in 
mobile phones) payment system implemented in this project required more time to complete the 
transaction, allowing buyers and sellers to talk more to each other, increasing the “conversation 
and sociability” within the community (p.6). However, they pointed out that this social ties came 
from the weakness of the implemented technology (SMS and more time to complete 
transactions), thus the expected rapid, anonymous digital transactions will reinforce the potential 
for losing sociability and interaction between local buyers and sellers, weakening social bonds, 
and consequently the community connections. 
Weakening social bonds could be a seriously problem that could compromise the success of 
social goal of a community currency as Nascimento (2015) observes, studying another Brazilian 
DCC based on card technology. For this author, the failure of a DCC implementation is related to 
the loss of community feelings and shared understanding about concepts such as “local 
belonging” and “solidarity”. So, while digital format can lower the operational costs and provide 
a better management to the use of the community currencies, on the other hand, it might not 
contribute to improve transparency and to increase the desired community feelings expected 
from them.  
As the mentioned projects vary from technology infrastructure, partners involved, types of 
transactions allowed and many other aspects, we believe that a deeper understanding of DCCs 
will be more valuable if we could classify them in a way that conflicts and benefits imposed to 
community currencies in digital format could be analyzed by groups of projects, instead of just 
looking to each independent project. Thus, we propose a classification for DCCs considering 
them as a particular case of digital payment platform. 
DIGITAL COMMUNITY CURRENCIES AS DIGITAL PAYMENT PLATFORMS  
Platform architectures are complex modular systems built in such a way that a stable core group 
of components (the platform itself) interacts with another group of complementary systems that 
varies in cross-section or over time (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009). These platforms mean to 
provide economies of scale and scope within and across companies, offering low-cost, 
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decentralized solutions for the various groups that transact with each other, either in a single 
company or supply chain or spread over ecosystems that comprise many different companies.  
In this sense, digital payment platforms are, using Abbott (2007) classification, a platform is a 
specialized system that provides payment services through any form of digital technology 
(Bapna, Goes, Wei, & Zhang, 2011). In general, considering retail applications, these digital 
payment platforms allow users to access funds in their deposit or credit accounts in financial 
institutions to initiate payments using plastic cards, the Internet, or mobile devices (Fung, 
Molico, & Stuber, 2014).  
Four Dimensions of the DCC as digital payment platforms 
An extensive literature review on the concept of platform in main journals and conferences of the 
IS field (Sun, Gregor & Keating, 2015) proposed six dimensions to be considered when 
investigating platforms. We took three of these dimensions that are directly related to the 
particular case of digital platform represented by DCC: technological base (here named as 
“architecture”), governance and transactionality. We also propose another dimension – virtuality 
– because it is particularly important for the discussion of community currencies, besides being 
also relevant for other cases of payment platforms. Each of these dimensions is explained next. 
Platform architecture 
Magnetic and electronic card systems are the base of a technology infrastructure that has 
dominated digital payment platforms for decades. In the card infrastructure, one dominant 
partner (the card issuer) issues cards to consumers and processes payment transactions from data 
collected by outsourced partners (acquirers). These platforms are highly centralized because of 
the card issuer’s control over the whole payment-processing system (Baldwin & Woodard, 
2009).  
More recently, technologies related to internet and smart phones have raised the interest on 
digital payment platforms. Mobile payment (m-payment) is defined as any payment that requires 
a mobile phone to initiate, authorize, and confirm a payment transaction (Kim, Mirusmonov, & 
Lee, 2010). M-payment is a natural evolution of digital payments and can be made via SMS or 
other protocols and provides access to money transfers and online payments (Kim et al., 2010). 
These digital payment platforms tend to include a bigger number of technology elements – 
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mobile applications, devices, mobile operators, etc. – having a more complex interaction among 
all of the elements since the hierarchy level among them is not so straightforward as it is in the 
card platforms. 
Jamari, a currency that circulates in the Brazilian Amazon is an example of digital payment 
platform that architecture is based on card (Gondim, 2012). The British Bristol Pound, in turn, 
operates in a more complex architecture, supporting transactions through mobile devices (SMS 
or mobile applications) and over the internet, through specific software (Ferreira et. al., 2015). 
Architecture describes how a complementary set of modules (technology infrastructure) is 
designed to operate into a relatively stable platform (Tiwana et al., 2010). From the architecture 
dimension perspective, we could see DCC divided in two broader groups: one, named “simple” 
that operates based on cards, and the other, named “complex” operating through the internet, 
mobile phones and other new technologies, such as blockchain.  
Platform governance 
Governance refers to the power of decision on what a platform effectively does, and who will 
approve its future directions. The degree of openness in a platform is one of the keys issues about 
governance (Staykova & Damsgaard, 2015; Ondrus et al, 2015). If the governance over a 
platform is shared among multiple owners or it is based on open standards, it represents a shared 
rather than proprietary platform (Tiwana, 2014). 
When a platform is not locked down, it can be adapted through the addition of new modules that 
enable a range of new uses (Tilson et al., 2013). While openness is important  in terms of 
potential marketing (Staykova & Damsgaard, 2015), the control (or ownership) of the platform’s 
stable core is critical to its performance, affecting technical issues as well as business 
arrangements that involve all the participants (Ballon et al., 2011). Thus, the decision of what a 
platform effectively does and who will approve its future directions is vital to its technical 
performance and business success.  
An example of proprietary governance is the currency Sardex, from the region of Sardina, Italy. 
Based on a mutual credit with zero balance – when two local businesses transact with each other, 
credit for one of them is recorded as debit for the other – it is a business-to-business (B2B) 
system fully controlled by the company that provides the technology (Littera, Sartori, Dini, 
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Antoniadis, 2014).  A different model, Palmas, a Brazilian DCC, is an example of shared control 
on the platform, since the community bank take strategic decisions about the currency in a 
communitarian forum with the neighborhood association (Fare at al., 2015). 
Thereby, taken the governance dimension, it is possible to capture the diversity of a DCC 
business model by understanding the payment platform according to two broader categories: 
shared or proprietary. 
Platform transactionality 
Another critical dimension of platforms is the transactionality, referring to the distinct groups of 
users that the platform brings together (Staykova & Damsgaard, 2015). From this perspective, a 
platform could perform one-sided, two-sided and multi-sided transactions (Hagiu, 2006).  
When a payment platform allows transactions between peers, such is the case of peer-to-peer 
(P2P) and B2B payments, it is called one-sided platform. This is the case of Wir, a Swiss DCC 
based on a B2B payment platform designed to operate transactions between small businesses in a 
delimited region of the country (Seyfang & Longhurst, 2013).  A P2P example is Faircoin, a 
Spanish cryptocurrency system, designed for payments between people that avoid the banking 
system (Lucarelli et al., 2014).  
In cases where transactions happen between users with two different profiles, then we have a 
two-sided platform. UDIS, a community currency from Costa Rica, is an example, which 
connects producers/merchants to consumers (Brenes, 2011).  
A multi-sided platform places more than two economic agents making transactions among 
themselves (Evans & Schmalensee, 2013; Hagiu and Wright, 2011). Chiemgauer, a German 
DCC, is a platform that connects business to consumers, but can also connect charity institutions 
that could receive donations through it (Thiel, 2012). Social government benefits can be also 
delivered through social currencies, allowing beneficiaries to buy basic products in local stores. 
Such is the case of currency Mumbuca, in Brazil, another case of multi-sided transaction. 
As DCCs can perform these three different ways of transaction – isolated or altogether –, this 
should be considered as a dimension for analysis when investigating them (Ramada-Sarasola, 
2012). This way, from the perspective of the transactionality dimension, we could see DCCs 
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focused in one-sided (e.g., P2P), two-sided (e.g., business-to-customer, or B2C) or multi-sided 
(e.g., government-to-person, or G2P) transactions in a single platform. 
Platform virtuality 
Based on two constructs proposed by the process virtualization theory: sensory and relationship 
requirements (Overby, 2008), we add a fourth dimension to a discussion about digital payment 
platforms: virtuality of the payment, since this is a point of concern when evaluating digital 
payments (Jansen, 2013). 
In the DCC scenario, the sensory requirements construct represents the first aspect of the 
virtuality dimension based on the fact that the convertibility to the official currency provides the 
“sensory connection” needed to ensure its real value, thus making it more amenable to adoption. 
An example of a convertible currency is Brixton, from England, issued by a community bank 
and backed 1-to-1 with the official currency, also possible to be redeemed (Blanc & Fare, 2015).  
On the other hand, there are a number of community currencies operating totally in parallel with 
the official currency system, without caring about any convertibility rate or not having any way 
to make a correspondent value between the two. Auroracoin, a criptocurrency from Iceland, is an 
example of totally virtual DCC that has transactions digitally signed in a blockchain (Lucarelli et 
al., 2014).  Another criptocurrency without convertibility to the official currency, Cadastral, from 
Ghana, is used to pay for real states services and land registering in the countryside by means of 
blockchains to guarantee transparency for the parts involved. Many time banking type of 
currencies are also included in this category (Carroll, 2013). 
Relationship requirements represent the second aspect of the virtuality dimension. It is related to 
the physical closeness between the two sides operating a payment transaction. The face-to-face 
transactions improve “knowledge acquisition, trust and friendship” since buying physically in 
local shops offer opportunities for sociable interactions in local communities, reinforcing the 
community feelings desired for a community currency.   
Payments made by inserting cards or Near Field Communication (NFC) technologies are 
examples ot transactions where physical presence is demanded. For DCCs, the face-to-face 
payment can have effects on the community feeling usually associated with the level of 
acceptance of the currency. Transactions happening without physical presence could affect the 
Taxonomy for Understanding Digital Community Currencies 
Proceedings of SIG GlobDev Ninth Annual Workshop, Dublin, Ireland, December 11, 2016 
raison d’être of the community currency itself, which was created to keep the money circulating 
inside a particular community, and thus compromising its local development goals (Warner, 
2014; Ramada-Sarasola, 2012). In the case of afore mentioned Brixton, face-to-face payments 
are kept to reinforce community feelings.  
Considering these two aspects of the virtuality dimension – convertibility and physical closeness 
–, we see the extreme case of a totally virtual DCC, one that is not convertible or not demand 
users to be physically close to each other to perform a payment, in opposition to the others with a 
lower level of virtuality, being either convertible to official currency or being used only when 
users are in the physical presence of each other (or both at the same time).   
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR CREATING A TAXONOMY FOR DCC 
Classifying emergent phenomena is an important first step for science (Carper & Snizek, 1980) 
and is useful in the construction of descriptive theories (Fawcet & Downs, 1986; Gregor, 2006). 
In social science, classifications are commonly made via taxonomy or typology. These two 
approaches are different since typologies are based on classes that have been previously defined 
whereas, in taxonomies, classes emerge in the course of the empirical research (Bailey, 1994).   
Considering that DCC is an emergent phenomenon and that previously typologies do not 
properly include the technological dimension of them, we propose a new taxonomy. We first 
identified a number of DCCs to be investigated and classified according to the main attributes to 
be compared. Then, we developed the taxonomy in three steps (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
At the first step, also known as the open coding phase, we started with the identification of 
relevant attributes gather from an intensive search about selected DCCs. In the second step, we 
looked for connections between the labels found in the previous step in order to aggregate them 
in more abstract concepts, or classes. The taxonomy itself came in the third step, when classes 
are integrated in higher-level categories of attributes and the selected currencies are classified 
according to these categories. This procedure is detailed bellow. 
Selecting a list of DCCs to be classified 
Based on secondary data, an extensive search to identify existing DCCs was carried over initially 
from August 2015 to November 2015 and then updated from August 2016 to September 2016. 
The search was taken on the literature about community currencies and on cases of DCC 
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available online. The main sources of data collection in this search were the International Journal 
of Community Currency Research, and two data bases containing information about community 
currencies: Community Currency Info and Community Currencies in Action.  
From an initial list of more than 100 community currencies identified in this first search, some of 
them were excluded due to: a) do not circulate in the digital format, b) do not have a clear social 
goal (Place & Bindewald, 2013), c) do not circulate as a particular community currency (only as 
official currency) and e) do not have enough information available about the currency  in its 
digital format (the used technology, for example). After this filtering process, 22 digital 
community currencies were selected for this study, circulating in thirteen different countries in 
Europe, South America, Asia and Africa. 
From this selection of currencies, we proceeded to a new search to find out more about the 
features and characteristics of each selected DCC. Besides the references previously used for 
finding the DCCs, we used Google and Google Scholar to obtain more detailed information 
about the currencies. In order to “avoid creating an inflexible model”, as described by Blanc 
(2011:2), a number of features for each currency were also highlighted, what could help us to 
understand and/or formulate the taxonomy, as well as contribute to the discussion of suitability 
and the benefits and conflitcs facing the studied DCCs.  
Open Coding based on Data Collection of Existing Community Currencies  
In this first step, 28 features of currencies were labeled for all 22 selected DCCs: 
provider/partners; social goal; type of sponsor; existence of demurrage rate; charge fee for 
conversion to official currencies; charge fee per transaction; charge membership fee; scriptural 
condition (the use of technology just in order to assign debit and credit); use of card; use of SMS; 
use in a mobile applications; use through the internet; use NFC; operates in online market places; 
works as cryptocurrency; circulate as P2P, B2B, B2C, B2E (business-to-employee, or salary 
payment), G2P (via government benefit); is integrated to transportation services; is integrated 
with telecom services; is integrated to donation projects; keep the circulation of the paper version 
in parallel with the digital version; is paired with the official currency (1 unit of community 
currency corresponding to a x units of official currency); is valued in hours; is backed by official 
currency (convertible in official); works under the zero balance system (one person's credit 
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equals another's debit, accounts sum to zero). Thus, in this step, we listed all the potential 
features that were possible to find for all the analyzed DCCs. 
Hierarchizing and grouping DCC features (or labels) in classes 
Comparing the 28 initial labels with concepts from the literature review we then created 9 second 
order classes. This way, the labels providers, partners and sponsors, were aggregated under a 
class named management; demurrage rate and fees for transaction, conversion and membership 
were joined under the business model class; scriptural type, online market place and card became 
a class named simple; SMS, mobile applications, internet, NFC and criptocurrency were 
aggregated in another class, titled complex; P2P, B2B, became one-sided; B2C and B2E became 
two-sided; G2P and integration with transportation, telecom and care systems became multi-
sided; DCCs that are paired with official currencies, also circulate in paper format and is valued 
in hours (time banking) were considered in a class named valued; backed by official currencies 
and zero balance system were aggregated under the class backed. Thus, in this step, we came up 
with second order codes and more abstract categories aggregating attributes from digital 
community currencies. 
Creating the categories for a taxonomy of DCCs 
The 9 classes of the previous step were then grouped in 4 more comprehensive categories related 
to the 4 dimensions of payment platform of the community currency previously presented in this 
paper: architecture, governance, transactionality, and virtuality. Thus, for creating the taxonomy, 
we ended up with four major categories to discuss DCCs in a more abstract way. All the four 
categories found are also based in the literature on digital platforms and community currencies 
presented previously in the paper and were important help in the creation of this higher level of 
aggregation for DCCs categories. The final aggregated categories and their elements are 
presented in figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Aggregated Categories 
The taxonomy for DCC 
Based on the four categories identified in the previous step, four questions were proposed to each 
DCC in order to classify them in groups: 
• Concerning the architecture dimension, is the DCC architecture simple or complex?  
• Concerning the governance dimension, is the DCC platform shared or proprietary?  
• Concerning the transactionality dimension, is the DCC focused on: one-sided, two-sided or multi-
sided transactions? 
• Concerning the virtuality dimension is the DCC totally virtual or non-virutal (operates in presence 
of the users or is convertible to official currency)?  
Based on answers to these 4 questions, we group the 22 DCC in 4 distinct groups and named 
them: Restrict, Intensive, Proprietary and Closed. There are, for each created group, relevant 
dimensions that group the currencies, e. g. governance and virtuality are the most relevant 
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dimensions for Restrict group. Table 1 present currencies and their groups according to the 
taxonomy. 
Currency Country Architecture  Transactionality Governance Virtuality Taxonomy 
Bristol Pound England Complex MultiSided Shared non-Virtual 
Restrict 
Brixton England Complex MultiSided Shared non-Virtual 
Chiemgauer Germany Simple MultiSided Shared non-Virtual 
Neuro Brazil Complex MultiSided Shared non-Virtual 
Palmas Brazil Complex MultiSided Shared non-Virtual 
Sampaio Brazil Complex MultiSided Shared non-Virtual 
UDIS Costa Rica Complex Two-Sided Shared non-Virtual 
Jamari Brazil Simple Multi-Sided Proprietary non-Virtual 
Proprietary 
Mumbuca Brazil Simple Multi-Sided Proprietary non-Virtual 
Sardex Italy Simple Two-Sided Proprietary Virtual 
WIR Switzerland Simple One-Sided Proprietary Virtual 
Zolkin Brazil Simple Two-Sided Proprietary Virtual 
EuroCat Spain Simple One-Sided Shared Virtual 
Closed Fureai Kippu  Japan Simple One-Sided Shared Virtual 
Tovi Finland Simple One-Sided Shared Virtual 
TradeQoin Netherlands Simple One-Sided Shared Virtual 
Auroracoin Iceland Complex One-Sided Proprietary Virtual 
Intensive 
Cadastrals Ghana Complex Two-Sided Proprietary Virtual 
EcoSol Spain Complex Two-Sided Shared Virtual 
FairCoin Spain Complex One-Sided Shared Virtual 
Positoo Netherlands Complex Two-Sided Shared Virtual 
Sonantes France Complex Two-Sided Shared Virtual 
Table 1: Currencies, countries and their classification in each group  
Characteristics of each DCC group  
The group Restrict comprises shared governance DCCs, generally operated by a community or 
cooperative bank, and they are all non virtual. Its social objectives are related to reinforce the 
community feelings, thus rely on face-to-face transactions to reinforce human values in financial 
transactions. They also have a paper circulating in parallel with de digital version. Those DCCs 
located in this group are typically created to promote local development and can simultaneously 
support B2C and P2P transactions. In general, their use is limited to geographically restricted 
communities; these currencies tend to strengthen the feeling of belonging to a community 
(Lietaer & Hallsmith, 2006). As this kind of community currency usually requires more complex 
architecture (with the exception of Chiemgauer), they also often involves many social groups in 
its implementation, which may increase the risk of failure due to the difficulties of coordinating 
those different groups (de Albuquerque et al., 2016). Its redeemability into official currency 
increases the users’ trust in this type of DCC, because it allows them to enter and exit the 
currency circuit whenever convenient (Renert, 2013). The architecture required, however, can 
generate costs for users (the cost of holding a mobile phone, for example) and currency managers 
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(better technological infrastructure), besides excluding the digitally illiterate (Menezes & 
Crocco, 2009). Designed to restricted communities, those currencies may require a considerable 
effort to be interoperable with larger systems, such as the traditional financial system. 
The DCCs in the group Proprietary have proprietary governance and do not make multi-
sideness transactions, being also based on card architecture. This group of DCCs may be 
associated with the distribution and control of a social benefit, sometimes being in fact designed 
to serve this particular purpose (Nascimento, 2015). They generally have a wider geographic 
coverage, transcending the boundaries of a local community, but hardly exceeding the 
boundaries of a city, for example. Because they are based on a less complex architecture, those 
DCCs are usually integrated to networks belonging to more traditional systems, such as credit or 
debit card operators (de Albuquerque e al., 2016), though with low interoperability with 
networks outside this particular loop. As it involves a smaller number of groups to be 
implemented, the acceptance of those DCCs is facilitated, which increases the trust on it. 
Acceptance is also reinforced when associated with social benefits. 
The Closed group comprises virtual DCCs operating in a closed system that could be based on 
mutual credit system with zero balance between companies (B2B) or time banking (P2P). DCCs 
classified in this category support exclusively B2B or P2P transactions. Because they are based 
in closed networks, when they are created to make B2B transactions, those currencies are 
designed to primarily favor the interests of local merchants, the social issues being only a 
secondary objective. The ones that support P2P transactions, on the other hand, were clearly 
designed primarily for social purposes. They demand less complex technology architecture of all 
DCC analyzed, often requiring only record of transactions, such as DCCs of the “time banking” 
type (Fare & Ahmed, 2015). In many cases, the technology is used just to support the basic 
infrastructure to process community currency transactions, but is not an essential part of their 
operations. They generally cannot be exchanged for official currency, but technology can play an 
important role in the transparency of transactions, which helps to increase trust in the DCCs. 
The DCCs in the Intensive group are based in more complex architecture and operate in a total 
virtual way, usually with no equivalent in paper format. The currencies grouped in this category 
have greater territorial coverage and are more comprehensive in supporting concurrent 
transactions (B2B, B2C, and P2P) on the same platform. They are exclusively digital currencies 
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and may involve payments via mobile applications or SMS, cryptocurrencies, or the operation of 
an account via the Internet. They keep high interoperability between different systems, which 
may increase trust in the use of those DCCs (Renert, 2013). However, the focus on local 
development is not clear, betraying community currencies’ traditional role (Lietaer & Hallsmith, 
2006). They depend on the integration with other networks, such as the telecom and financial 
systems, and may exclude less technologically literate users and those who cannot afford the 
costs of technological devices needed to transact in these systems (Menezes & Crocco, 2009).  
FINAL COMMENTS 
This paper seeks to deepen the discussion on the role of community currencies’ digital format, 
identifying categories of use and technology incorporation in the various DCC existing projects. 
From the analysis of 22 DCCs, a taxonomy of four categories was proposed, based on the 
architecture, governance, transactionality and virtuality of the adopted digital payment platform 
for each currency, what led to a four different groups of currencies. For each of these groups we 
could explain the potential benefits and conflicts that digital platforms can bring to community 
currencies.  
For the Restrict group, while is possible to see some improvement in the currency management, 
as well as a reduction in the costs to keep it operating, there is a clear risk for the purpose of 
develop a community feeling, the most common declared reason for the very existence of this 
type of currency. For the Proprietary group, while the main benefit is the potential inclusion of 
social grants into the currency circulation the main conflict is expected within the control of the 
platform, usually centralized and not well adapted to communitarian goals. For the Closed 
group, the main benefit of the digital platform is the cost and practical use, particularly if used 
from a mobile device, with not a clear conflict since by the own nature of the currencies in this 
group, technology is simple, governance is shared and the community feelings are kept intact in 
a closed circuit of users. The Intensive group is the more aggressive in adopting new 
technologies and benefit from the potential of expand the territorial base of a community and is 
probably the best-suited model for virtual communities, however it can demand users more 
digitally include and literate.  
As a practical contribution for the DCC managers, this paper organizes the discussion on 
potential benefits and conflicts of each type of currency. In sum, the most relevant issues found 
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are the risk to the community feelings because of the virtuality dimension, and the introduction 
of new actors that comes along the technology and can compromise the shared governance spirit 
of most community organizations. On the other hand, virtual communities – that were not the 
focus of this research that listed only currencies from territorial communities – and closed 
communities have almost no restrictions to adopt digital platforms for their currencies. 
The theoretical contribution of this paper is the proposition of a model of four dimensions to 
analyze one particular case of digital payment platform, including the virtuality dimension, 
original in the literature on platforms in the IS field. From the model developed in this paper, it is 
possible to design new investigations on other cases of financial oriented platforms, which is an 
open field since the emergence of the Fintech phenomenon in the last few years. Since among 
the issues related to digital platforms are metrics and, by consequence, their evolution (Tiwana, 
2014), this model of four dimensions can represent a good point to start new researches. 
On the limitations of the paper, the most important one is the choice of relying only in secondary 
information about the currencies, what in first place limited the number of currencies that were 
included in this study and, secondly, could not clarify many aspects of the studied DDC projects. 
Another limitation was the manual process of coding the features to turn them into classes, what 
was possible only because of the limited number of 22 currencies investigated. For coding 
features of a bigger number of currencies, this manual process would not viable and the use of 
tools to support the analysis would be mandatory. A third limitation is the exclusion of the 
dimension interoperability from the analysis. This is surely an important aspect, but it was a 
decision taken based in two rationalities: first is the fact that community currencies are in general 
limited in circulation and thus based on little interoperability; second is also related to the access 
of information about the currencies, meaning that by including this dimension it would be 
necessary to focus only in a even more limited number of currencies to be studied.  
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